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In modern ﬁnance theory, stock prices are not only inﬂuenced by value-relevant information, but also sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀected by investor sentiment. Real-world investors are not always as rational as traditional theory
assumes. Cognitive bias and emotional behavior inﬂuence investors to form biased expectations or judgments
during valuation and incur price ﬂuctuations through noise trading. Noise trading leads to valuation errors in
the capital market and harms the eﬃciency and stability of the capital market (Brown and Cliﬀ, 2004, 2005;
Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Wang and Sun, 2004).
The inﬂuence of investor sentiment on stock prices is more pronounced during initial public oﬀerings
(IPOs). The serious information asymmetry that investors face during IPOs makes them more susceptible
to emotional factors and causes false investment decisions. However, short-selling constraints during IPOs
make stock prices reﬂect only the expectations of optimistic investors and exaggerate the inﬂuence of senti-
ment. Foreign studies of IPO initial returns have found that rational factors such as information asymmetry,
controlling rights and litigation risk are insuﬃcient in explaining IPO initial returns and that investor senti-
ment plays a prominent role (Ljungqvist et al., 2006; Derrien, 2005; Cornelli et al., 2006). These studies have
proposed that the over-optimism of investors in the secondary market pushes stock prices above their intrinsic
value and leads to irrational initial returns.
The Chinese stock market has a shorter history than mature capital markets and its market mechanisms
remain imperfect (China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2008). IPO initial returns in China were once
the most anomalous returns around the world and have drawn a great deal of attention from researchers,
practitioners and regulators. Meanwhile, the high oﬀering prices, high price-to-earnings ratios and enormous
funds raised during IPOs have attracted a great deal of attention from Chinese investors. One report from the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange shows that most of the traders involved on the initial oﬀering date are individuals
and cover 90% of the total trading amount on the buy side. As a result of this individual majority, stock prices
are highly aﬀected by sentiment in China. Much evidence has shown that IPO initial returns are highly aﬀected
by investor sentiment from the secondary market and that price premiums on initial oﬀering dates are caused
by over-optimistic behavior (Song and Liang, 2001; Cao and Dong, 2006; Jiang, 2007).
Trading activity caused by investor sentiment constitutes noise trading in the capital market. Based on
Black’s (1986) deﬁnition of noise trading, information insuﬃciency and asymmetry are the basic premises
of noise trading. In other words, investors are not priori irrational, but are rather forced to make investment
decisions based on sentiment because information asymmetry makes information lack relevance and reliabil-
ity. As a result, sentiment factors aﬀect trading behavior and make stock prices deviate from their intrinsic
value. Consequently, this paper tries to determine whether improving the information environment and
decreasing the information asymmetry between companies and investors can decrease noise trading and hence
decrease the eﬀect of investor sentiment on stock prices.
Sell-side ﬁnancial analysts are an important part of the information environment. Taking advantage of
their privileged information sources and professional analysis, analysts produce earnings forecasts and invest-
ment ratings for investors. Analyst reports are especially important information sources for individuals, who
suﬀer from information asymmetry. As Chinese analysts continue developing, they are playing an increasingly
important role in market pricing (Huang and Ding, 2011). Numerous studies have conﬁrmed that analyst fore-
casts reduce information asymmetry between companies and investors (Zhu et al., 2007). However, studies
have focused only on listed ﬁrms and the information role of analyst forecasts for pre-listing ﬁrms remains
unknown. Contrary to the constraints placed on analyst forecasts for pre-listing ﬁrms in foreign countries,
there is no such prohibition in the Chinese stock market. Analysts can follow pre-listing ﬁrms and forecast
oﬀering prices. This paper examines whether analyst during the pre-IPO period can improve pricing eﬃciency
and stabilize the market.
Based on the actual conditions of the Chinese stock market, this paper follows classic theories related to
IPO initial returns in behavioral ﬁnance, uses analyst (price) forecast bias and forecast dispersion to measure
the quality of the information environment, and examines the interactive inﬂuence of the information environ-
ment and market-wide sentiment on IPO initial returns. To verify the inﬂuence of market sentiment on IPO
initial returns, this paper ﬁnds that the smaller the analyst forecast bias or dispersion, the lower the eﬀect mar-
ket-wide sentiment has on IPO initial returns. These ﬁndings indicate that information asymmetry is a basic
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eﬀect of analyst forecasts is more pronounced during periods of rising markets than periods of falling markets.
This indicates that rising markets may enhance investment willingness and that a high amount of investor
attention eﬀectively explains value-relevant information. Finally, this paper ﬁnds that analyst forecasts have
a more pronounced eﬀect when IPO prices lack regulation, indicating that regulation also plays an important
role.
This paper makes three main contributions to the existing literature. First, it enriches the research related to
IPO initial returns. It also details the noise trading generation process and demonstrates that improving the
information environment can restrain noise trading and reduce the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on ini-
tial returns. These ﬁndings are conducive to understanding anomalous returns and, more importantly, iden-
tifying eﬀective ways to decrease the sentimental premium for IPO ﬁrms. In addition, this paper uses analyst
forecasts as a proxy for the external information environment and thus provides a diﬀerent perspective of the
information environment from that of other studies.
Second, this paper contributes to the analyst forecast literature. Due to the analyst following constraint
placed on pre-listing ﬁrms, studies have focused only on the analyst forecasts of listed ﬁrms and conﬁrmed
the intermediary role of analysts’ information. Contrary to listed ﬁrms, pre-listing ﬁrms face a more severe
information asymmetry problem and the demand for analysts as intermediaries are more urgent. Based on this
special institutional setting in China, this paper veriﬁes the intermediary role of analysts for pre-IPO ﬁrms.
Third, this paper provides empirical evidence for behavioral ﬁnance theory. It focuses on the basic question
of behavioral ﬁnance: how does investor sentiment aﬀect stock prices? Although basic behavioral ﬁnance the-
ory observes that information asymmetry is an important objective reason for noise trading, empirical results
remain scarce. Taking advantage of the special research setting of the Chinese IPO market, our paper provides
empirical evidence for the theory and thus contributes to the existing literature.
Zhu et al. (2013) also investigate the relationship between market sentiment and Chinese IPO initial returns
and determine that the better the accounting quality, the weaker the inﬂuence of market sentiment on initial
returns. However, they focus on the internal information environment, which reduces the inﬂuence of market
sentiment on initial returns. This paper focuses on analyst forecasts before listing and emphasizes the eﬀect of
the external information environment. As the Chinese stock market has developed, analysts have become an
indispensable component of the information environment and have essential implications for investor behav-
ior. In this sense, our paper is a supplement to that of Zhu et al. (2013) and enriches our understanding of the
information environment for IPO ﬁrms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Part II summarizes the related literature. Part III
develops our hypotheses. Part IV describes our research design. Part V provides the empirical results. Part
VI concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
2.1. IPO initial return literature
IPO initial returns are among the most long-standing anomalies in the capital market. Studies have pro-
duced two theories as to their origin, primary market underpricing theory and secondary market overpricing
theory. Primary market underpricing theory considers information asymmetry between subscribers (Rock,
1986; Benveniste and Wilhelm, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Ibbotson, 1975) and agency problems
(Brennan and Franks, 1997; Stoughton and Zechner, 1998) to lead to valuation risk during IPOs. To maintain
the oﬀering process, companies must keep the oﬀering price under its intrinsic value. When stocks enter the
secondary market, their prices soon return to their intrinsic value and IPO initial returns are formed.
The basic assumption of primary market underpricing theory is that the secondary market is eﬃcient and
stock prices reﬂect value-relevant information in a fair and timely manner. However, this assumption does not
always hold. IPO initial returns caused by the Internet bubble in the early 21st century made researchers sus-
picious of the theory. They re-examined IPO initial returns from the perspective of the pricing mechanism in
the secondary market and ultimately proposed secondary market overpricing theory. The theory observes that
high IPO initial returns are caused not by under-valuated oﬀering prices, but by optimistic trading behavior on
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that individuals’ demand for new issues is positively related to pre-IPO market returns and IPO initial returns.
Cornelli et al. (2006) use oﬀering prices in the pre-listing market to measure investor optimism, which they
determine to be positively related to IPO initial returns and negatively related to long-term returns.
According to the IPO initial return calculation method, the oﬀering and trading prices on an initial date
codetermine the initial return. Consequently, primary market underpricing theory and secondary market over-
pricing theory are both reasonable. In fact, the principal factor inﬂuencing IPO initial returns diﬀers between
markets and periods.
IPO initial returns in China were once the most anomalous returns around the world and attracted a great
deal of attention from researchers, practitioners and regulators. Contrary to mature markets, IPOs in the Chi-
nese stock market have some speciﬁc characteristics.
The pricing process of Chinese IPOs is not market driven. Issuer, oﬀering price and share placement qual-
iﬁcations are highly regulated by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission. These regulations oﬀset the
incentives of issuers and hence decrease pricing eﬃciency. For example, under the current inquiry system,
underwriters cannot decide the share of allotment and their incentive to discover intrinsic value is highly weak-
ened. Therefore, the basic premise of primary market underpricing theory does not hold in the Chinese stock
market and pre-listing ﬁrms in China are unwilling to lower the oﬀering price (Han and Wu, 2007). In con-
trast, regulation is one of the most signiﬁcant contributors to price suppression (Liu and Xiong, 2005; Zhu
and Qian, 2010) and price suppression in China is a result of government intervention (Tian, 2010).
Chinese investors, especially individuals, show extraordinary enthusiasm for new issues. High oﬀering
prices, price-to-earnings ratios and raised fund amounts often co-exist during IPOs. Many studies have discov-
ered that investor sentiment and secondary market overpricing theory have signiﬁcant explanatory power for
IPO initial returns in China. For example, Song and Liang (2001) ﬁnd that measurements of secondary market
activity are signiﬁcantly related to IPO initial returns. Cao and Dong (2006) observe that, relative to trading
prices, oﬀering prices provide more information about intrinsic value and that artiﬁcially high trading prices in
the secondary market contribute to anomalous initial returns. Jiang (2007) compares the diﬀerent factors that
inﬂuence initial returns and ﬁnds that optimism and investor activity in the secondary market are the most
prominent factors. However, the author also ﬁnds that market eﬃciency theory and information asymmetry
theory are inadequate for explaining initial returns. All of the preceding studies demonstrate that investor sen-
timent is an inﬂuencing factor. However, the reasons for noise trading must be analyzed further.
Trading driven by sentiment constitutes noise trading in the capital market. Black (1986) introduces the
concept of noise trading into the capital market. According to its deﬁnition, in a situation of information
insuﬃciency and asymmetry, investors may account for value-irrelevant information in their trading behavior.
Such trading is known as noise trading. Studies of irrational trading behavior have mainly focused on subjec-
tive reasons. However, according to the preceding deﬁnition, the generation of noise trading is inseparably
correlated with the information environment faced by investors. Noise trading has both subjective and objec-
tive causes, but studies have rarely discussed the latter. This paper tries to determine the objective causes. We
try to verify whether improving the information environment can reduce noise trading and hence lower the
inﬂuence of investor sentiment on stock prices.
2.2. Studies of the relationship between the information environment and analyst forecasts
Sell-side ﬁnancial analysts are important information intermediaries and an essential part of the informa-
tion environment. With their privileged information sources and professional analysis, analysts produce earn-
ings forecasts and investment ratings for investors. Due to their information asymmetry, individuals ﬁnd
analyst reports to be especially important information sources. Previous studies have discovered that analyst
forecasts aﬀect investor expectations signiﬁcantly (Fried and Givoly, 1982). This inﬂuence depends on the
forecast quality. Brown and Rozeﬀ (1979) and Brown et al. (1987) ﬁnd that the inﬂuence of analyst forecasts
on market expectations is positively related to the accuracy of the forecasts. As security analysts have devel-
oped and improved, their inﬂuence in China has also improved. Huang and Ding (2011) ﬁnd that as the accu-
racy of analyst forecasts increased after 2005, analyst forecasts have become a better proxy for market
expectations than management forecasts or expectations calculated by the random walk model.
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Companies are ﬁrst-hand information sources and analyst forecast quality is highly correlated with the infor-
mation environment. Lang and Lundholm (1996) ﬁnd that the higher the quality of corporate information
disclosure, the greater the analyst following and the more accurate the forecasts. Li and Jia (2009) also ﬁnd
that the improvement of corporate disclosure quality and institutional backgrounds can signiﬁcantly enhance
analyst forecast accuracy and lower forecast dispersion. However, the information collection and production
processes led by analysts improve the transfer of information between companies and investors. These activ-
ities improve the information environment and lower the information asymmetry between insiders and outsid-
ers. For example, Zhu et al. (2007) ﬁnd that analyst following improves the informativeness of stock prices and
hence lowers stock price synchronicity.
Given the relationship between analyst forecasts and the information environment, researchers usually use
analyst following or forecasts as proxies for the quality of the information environment. Lang et al. (2003) use
analyst following and forecast accuracy to measure the information environment. Gebhardt et al. (2001) use
forecast dispersion to measure the information environment. He et al. (2012) use analyst forecast bias and
forecast dispersion to measure the information environment.
Researchers have not yet determined the relationship between analyst forecasts and oﬀering prices or IPO
initial returns due to the analyst forecast regulations in most countries. Taking the U.S. stock market as an
example, analysts are forbidden to publish forecasts from the pre-IPO period up to 40 days after listing. In
contrast, analyst forecasts before listing are permitted in China, creating an opportunity for researchers.
Chu and Cang (2008) investigate the relationship between forecast dispersion before listing and IPO initial
returns based on valuation risk and ﬁnd the two to be positively related. Yao (2011) ﬁnds a positive relation-
ship between analyst optimism before listing and initial returns. Chu and Cang (2008) and Yao (2011) base
their studies on primary market underpricing theory and secondary market overpricing theory, respectively.
However, the complexity of the factors inﬂuencing IPO initial returns makes it diﬃcult to distinguish between
the two theories and a gap in the research remains.3. Hypothesis development
According to the analytical framework for IPO initial returns in the behavioral ﬁnance ﬁeld, initial returns
are mainly caused by over-optimistic trading behavior in the secondary market. First, although expectations
vary across investors, short-selling constraints during IPOs prohibit pessimistic investors from trading. As
such, price reﬂects only optimistic expectations. Second, resource scarcity and historical high yields for new
issues exaggerate investor optimism. Consequently, transaction prices on initial trading dates are unilaterally
determined by optimistic investors and quickly rise above their intrinsic value.
High overall market yields are among the most important causes of investor optimism. The current high
level of market returns makes investors overestimate the market’s persistence and form overly optimistic
expectations of company prospects, thereby enhancing investors’ intent for new issues (Derrien, 2005).
The trading activity driven by investor sentiment constitutes noise trading in the stock market. Noise trad-
ing not only makes stock prices unfairly reﬂect value relevant information but also harms the eﬃciency of the
capital markets. According to Black’s (1986) deﬁnition of noise trading, information insuﬃciency and asym-
metry are the primary causes of noise trading. In other words, investors are not priori irrational. Information
asymmetry makes their decision-making process lack suﬃcient information, which introduces the sentiment
signal into investment decisions.
Relative to listed ﬁrms, IPO ﬁrms disclose ﬁnite information to the market. This makes the information
asymmetry more severe and the valuation risk higher. As a result, noise trading is more frequent and the inﬂu-
ence of sentiment on stock price is more severe. Finally, high IPO initial returns are formed. Improving the
information environment and decreasing information asymmetry may enhance the suﬃciency and certainty
of information during the decision-making process, and hence increase the weight investors place on value-
relevant information and decrease the inﬂuence of investor sentiment on IPO initial returns.
As important information intermediaries between listed ﬁrms and investors, analysts play an essential role
in the information environment. Through privileged information channels and professional information
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important information sources and signiﬁcantly aﬀect market expectations.
Analyst forecasts are highly correlated with the information environment. Companies are ﬁrst-hand infor-
mation sources that include not only public disclosure but also private disclosure during ﬁeld studies. As a
result, analyst forecast quality is highly correlated with a company’s information environment. However,
the information collection and production processes led by analysts improve the transfer of information
between companies and investors and hence lower the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Li and Jia, 2009).
For these reasons, researchers usually use analyst forecast characteristics as proxies for the quality of the
information environment (Lang et al., 2003; Gebhardt et al., 2001; He et al., 2012). Following previous stud-
ies, this paper uses analyst forecast bias and forecast dispersion to measure the quality of the information envi-
ronment. As no constraints are placed on analyst forecasts for pre-listing ﬁrms, the Chinese stock market is an
ideal context for investigating the function of analyst forecasts (proxies of the information environment) to
limit the inﬂuence of market sentiment on noise trading.
According to the preceding analysis, we expect the improvement of the information environment to
decrease the asymmetry between ﬁrms and investors, and thus weaken the eﬀect of market-wide sentiment
on IPO initial returns. Using analyst forecast characteristics as proxies for the information environment,
we propose the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1.1. Lower analyst forecast bias signiﬁcantly reduces the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on
IPO initial returns.Hypothesis 1.2. Lower analyst forecast dispersion signiﬁcantly reduces the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment
on IPO initial returns.
In the capital market, market eﬃciency is closely related to the attention investors pay to information. Clas-
sic behavioral ﬁnance theory observes that investor attention is usually limited when he or she is faced with
complicated tasks and complex information (Aboody et al., 2010). Consequently, investor attention varies
with market conditions and is usually high during periods when the market is rising (Karlsson et al., 2009;
Hou et al., 2008). During these periods, investors’ belief in potential gains for new issues makes them willing
to participate in new issue oﬀerings. Consequently, value-relevant information including analyst forecasts
gains more attention than it would during periods of market decline. Paying a lot of attention makes investors
fully understand the value-relevant messages of analyst forecasts and ensures that the information environ-
ment plays a more prominent role. In contrast, investors’ willingness to participate in new issue oﬀerings
declines when the market drops. Consequently, value-relevant information such as analyst forecasts receives
less attention and the role of the information environment declines. Therefore, we propose the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2.1. The role of lower analyst forecast bias in reducing the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on
IPO initial returns is more prominent during periods in which the market is rising.Hypothesis 2.2. The role of lower analyst forecast dispersion in reducing the inﬂuence of market-wide senti-
ment on IPO initial returns is more prominent during periods in which the market is rising.
According to the preceding analysis, improvement of the information environment may reduce the inﬂu-
ence of market-wide sentiment on IPO initial returns. In fact, IPO initial returns include the inﬂuence of both
oﬀering and trading prices. It is possible that both primary market underpricing theory and secondary market
overpricing theory apply. Studies of primary market underpricing theory have argued that oﬀering-price dis-
counts are caused not by ﬁrms in China but by regulators. To keep the Chinese stock market stable in its early
stages, the China Securities Regulatory Commission regulated oﬀering prices based on the price-to-earnings
ratio. For example, the price-to-earnings ratio was kept below 20 during 2002–2004. The upper limit of the
price-to-earnings ratio was canceled when the new security law was promulgated and the inquiry system
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prices and recommended that the price-to-earnings ratio remains below 30. In late 2009, the oﬀering price reg-
ulation was completely canceled and IPO pricing entered an age of marketization.
The regulation of the price-to-earnings ratio during IPOs produces value-relevant information and espe-
cially good news that is otherwise insuﬃciently reﬂected in stock prices. Primary market underpricing theory
is therefore likely to play a more important role in initial returns. Consequently, the eﬀect of the information
environment on noise trading in the secondary market may be weaker during regulatory periods. On the con-
trary, regulations disappear during marketization periods and the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on IPO
initial returns becomes stronger. Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3.1. The role of lower analyst forecast bias in reducing the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on
IPO initial returns is more prominent during marketization periods than during regulatory periods.
Hypothesis 3.2. The role of lower analyst forecast dispersion in reducing the inﬂuence of market-wide senti-
ment on IPO initial return is more prominent during marketization periods than during regulatory periods.4. Research design
4.1. Sample selection
We select IPO ﬁrms from the Chinese A-share market during 2001–2011 and obtain 1326 observations. We
remove 27 ﬁnancial industry observations and 13 special listings from the sample (including 1 private place-
ment listing, 2 leftover historical listings and 10 stock swap listings). We also remove sample ﬁrms followed by
three or fewer analysts before listing and ultimately obtain 949 observations. We source ﬁnancial and analyst
forecast data before IPOs from the WIND database; IPO, ﬁnancial and stock trading data after listing from
the CSMAR database; and investment account data from the CCER database.4.2. Empirical model and variable deﬁnitions
In examining our hypotheses, we establish the following econometric models to investigate the inﬂuence of
analyst forecast bias and forecast dispersion on IPO initial returns:IR ¼ b0 þ b1  SENT þ b2  Lerr þ b3  Lerr  SENT þ b4  PE þ b5  TAþ b6  ROE
þ b7  LEV þ b8  Growthþ b9  Shrissþ b10  Ageþ b11  Reguþ b12  Delay
þ b13  ZXBþ b14  CYBþ Ind Dummy þ Year Dummy þ e ð1Þ
IR ¼ b0 þ b1  SENT þ b2  Ldisp þ b3  Ldisp  SENT þ b4  PE þ b5  TAþ b6  ROE
þ b7  LEV þ b8  Growthþ b9  Shrissþ b10  Ageþ b11  Reguþ b12  Delay
þ b13  ZXBþ b14  CYBþ Ind Dummy þ Year Dummy þ e ð2ÞWe deﬁne the variables as follows.
4.2.1. IPO initial return
The independent variable IR refers to the IPO initial return and reﬂects the percentage change from the
oﬀering price to the close price on the initial date. IR = (Close price on initial date  Oﬀering price)/Oﬀering
price.4.2.2. Market-wide sentiment
Studies have measured investor sentiment through direct and indirect methods. Among the direct methods
are questionnaires submitted to investors. Although such a method directly reﬂects the ex ante sentiment, sam-
ple selection bias and measurement error (i.e., the feedback from questionnaire subjects deviates from reality)
make it problematic. Indirect methods measure sentiment through ex postmeasurement, including market
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discounts. Relative to direct methods, indirect methods are easy to obtain and replicate.
Lacking authoritative and continuous questionnaires to capture investor sentiment in China, researchers
have usually measured sentiment indirectly. We choose measurements based on the following rules. The ﬁrst
rule is applicability. Due to diﬀerences in institutional background and market environment, foreign market
measurements are not applicable to China. For example, Lee et al. (1991) ﬁnd that close-end fund discounts
are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by sentiment and have become popular measurements. However, close-end funds in
China remain very small, lack liquidity and are inconvenient for reﬂecting investor sentiment (Liu and Xiong,
2005). The second rule is pertinence. Because individuals play an important role in the Chinese stock market,
the measurement we choose should reﬂect the variability of individual investors’ sentiments. Measurements
such as monthly net purchased funds and cash holding percentage by funds reﬂect only the sentiments of insti-
tutional investors and are unsuitable for our context. The third rule is availability. Availability determines the
cost and replicability of our research. Accordingly, we choose the following two measurements.
The ﬁrst measurement is Mret, which stands for pre-IPO market returns (120 trading days before listing).
As a sentiment signal, market returns have an important inﬂuence and implications for investor sentiment and
trading behavior. Fisher and Statman (2002) ﬁnd that investor sentiment and market returns are positively
related. Derrien (2005) also observes that high market returns before listing enhance the demand for new
issues and result in high IPO initial returns. Accordingly, we expect Mret to be positively related to initial
returns.
The second measurement is NewAcct, which stands for the number of investment accounts opened during
the IPO month. NewAcct refers to the willingness of over-the-counter investors’ participation and directly
reﬂects market-wide sentiment. Han and Wu (2007) use monthly opened investment accounts to measure
investor sentiment. Shiller (2005) identiﬁes the increase in stock market participants as an important cause
of the bull market. Accordingly, we expect NewAcct to be positively related to IPO initial returns.
4.2.3. Analyst forecasts
We use analyst forecast bias and forecast dispersion to measure the information environment of IPO ﬁrms.
We obtain analyst forecast data before listing (i.e., before the oﬀering price is determined) from the WIND
database.4 We use the middle point of the interval forecast as the forecast value to calculate the forecast bias
and forecast bias.
We deﬁne analyst forecast bias as shown in Eq. (3). Erri refers to the analyst consensus forecast bias of ﬁrm
i. Forecast_Pi,j stands for the oﬀering price forecast of ﬁrm i from analyst j. Pi,0 stands for the oﬀering price of
ﬁrm i. We deﬁne analyst forecast dispersion as shown in equation (4). Dispi stands for the forecast dispersion
of ﬁrm i.4 InErri ¼MedianðForecast P i;jÞ  P i;0P i;0 : ð3Þ
Dispi ¼
StdðForecast P i;jÞ
MedianðForecast P i;jÞ : ð4ÞTo ensure the empirical results provide economic implications, we transform the continuous measurements
according to the following equation and ﬁnally obtain Lerri (which stands for a low level of forecast bias)
and Ldispi (which stands for a low level of forecast dispersion):Lerri ¼ MaxðErriÞ  Erri
MaxðErriÞ MinðErriÞ : ð5Þ
Ldispi ¼
MaxðDispiÞ  Dispi
MaxðDispiÞ MinðDispiÞ
: ð6ÞMax(Erri) and Min(Erri) refer to the maximum and minimum forecast bias values in the total sample, respec-
tively. Max(Dispi) and Min(Dispi) refer to the maximum and minimum forecast dispersion values in the totalour paper, the term “analysts” refers to sell-side analysts.
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structed continuous variables and vary between 0 and 1. The larger the variable Lerri, the lower the level
of analyst forecast bias. Based on the preceding analysis, a lower forecast bias, indicating a higher-quality
information environment, helps to limit the frequency of noise trading and weaken the inﬂuence of market-
wide sentiment on IPO initial returns. In addition, relative to optimistic forecasts, pessimistic forecasts play
a more prominent role in weakening the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on initial returns. Accordingly,
we expect b3 to be signiﬁcantly negative in models (1) and (2).
4.2.4. Control variables
IPO initial returns are inﬂuenced by both primary market underpricing and secondary market overpricing.
We focus on the latter. Consequently, we add PE (the oﬀering price-to-earnings ratio) to control for the eﬀect
of the oﬀering price and calculate the oﬀering price-to-earnings ratio according to the fully diluted method. All
other things being equal, the higher the oﬀering price, the lower the initial return. Accordingly, we expect b4 to
be signiﬁcantly negative.
Next, we follow previous studies in controlling for the factors that inﬂuence primary market underpricing.
TA refers to the natural logarithm of the total assets at the end of the previous year before listing. Booth and
Chua (1996) observe that large ﬁrms are more transparent and easily evaluated than small ﬁrms. As such,
assets and IPO initial returns are negatively related. LEV refers to the leverage ratio at the end of the previous
year before listing. Chen et al. (2004) use the leverage ratio to measure ex-ante risk and ﬁnd the leverage ratio
to be positively related to IPO initial returns. Growth refers to sales growth at the end of the previous year
before listing. Growth companies are diﬃcult to evaluate due to their volatile ﬁnancial performance. Shriss
refers to the proportion of new issues after listing. Beatty and Ritter (1986) observe that small issues are easy
to manipulate. As such, companies must use higher discounts to compensate for investor risk. Meanwhile,
price manipulation always leads to stock trading premiums. As a result, we predict that IPO initial returns
are higher for small-issue stocks. Age refers to the number of days (divided by 360) between a company’s
establishment and its IPO. Ritter (1984) observes that the longer a company is established, the more informa-
tion investors should obtain and the easier the evaluation should be. We expect ﬁrm age to be negatively
related to initial returns. We add ROE (i.e., the return on equity at the end of the previous year before listing)
to control for the inﬂuence of proﬁtability.
In light of the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the institutional background on IPO initial returns, we add an insti-
tutional variable to control for its potential eﬀect. First, Regu is a dummy variable representing oﬀering-price
regulation. It equals 1 if the oﬀering price is determined according to regulation and 0 if the oﬀering price is
determined through a market-oriented mechanism. In this paper, the sample period covers four periods. The
ﬁrst period is the trial period for market-oriented pricing (before October 2001), during which oﬀering prices
were independently determined by the listing ﬁrm and the underwriter. Regu equals 0 if the ﬁrm issued during
this period. The second period is the oﬀering-price limitation period (between November 2001 and December
2004), during which oﬀering prices had to be lower than 20 times the earnings per share under the regulation of
the China Securities Regulatory Commission. Regu equals 1 if the ﬁrm issued during this period. The third
period is the oﬀering-price limitation canceling period (from January 2005 to June 2009), during which the
China Securities Regulation Commission canceled the oﬀering-price upper-limit regulation and provided
guidelines for new issues. The usual upper limit was 30 times the oﬀering-price-to-earnings ratio. Accordingly,
Regu equals 1 if the ﬁrm issued during this period and the oﬀering-price-to-earnings ratio is between 28 and 32,
and 0 otherwise. The fourth period is the market-oriented pricing period (after July 2009), during which oﬀer-
ing-price regulations were canceled. Regu equals 0 if the ﬁrm issued during this period. Oﬀering-price regula-
tion restricts the upper limit of the price and results in a high initial return. As such, we expect Regu to be
positively related to initial returns.
Second, Mok and Hui (1998) state that the waiting period before listing is too long in China and that a long
waiting period increases the risk for investors. As such, a company must lower the oﬀering price and provide a
high premium to compensate for investor risk. Accordingly, we add Delay to control for the waiting period. It
equals the number of days (divided by 360) between the ﬁrm’s oﬀering and listing. We expect Delay to be neg-
atively related to initial returns.
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a growth enterprise market. The listing rules and pricing processes vary with the type of market. However,
ﬁrm characteristics also vary with the type of market. Relative to ﬁrms listed on the main board, ﬁrms listed
on the small- and medium-sized enterprises board or in the growth enterprise market are usually smaller and
growing faster. Accordingly, we add two dummy variables, ZXB (which equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the
small- and medium-sized enterprises board and 0 otherwise) and CYB (which equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed
in the growth enterprise market and 0 otherwise), to capture the listing board characteristics.
We also add dummy variables to control for the inﬂuence of industry factors. Table 1 summarizes the
variables.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level to
eliminate the inﬂuence of extreme values. Although the mean value of IPO initial returns for Chinese new
issues declines from 2001 to 2011, it remains higher than that of mature capital markets. The standard devi-
ation of initial returns is 79.1%, indicating a large diﬀerence between ﬁrms. More than 90% of new issues gain
positive initial returns and only 93 new issues fall on debut (mainly in 2010 and 2011). The mean value of
cumulative returns 120 trading days before listing is 23.9%, with a standard deviation of 35.7%. Seventy-six
percent of the total sample is issued when the market is rising and 24% is issued in periods of falling markets.
New issues in China cannot time their listing due to the oﬀering regulations. This institutional background is
convenient for our research. Although the mean value of investment accounts opened during the month of
listing is about 705,300, the minimum is 47,000 and maximum is about 4.2 million. In addition, the average
analyst following is about eight. The average forecast bias is 24.8% of the oﬀering price and the maximum
value is 3.25 times the oﬀering price. The average forecast dispersion is 17% of the oﬀering price. The analysts
are generally optimistic; the forecast optimism is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
IR IPO initial return. Reﬂects the percentage change in price from the oﬀering price to the close price on the initial date.
IR = (Close price on initial date–Oﬀering price)/oﬀering price
Mret Market return pre-IPO (120 trading days before listing)
NewAcct Number of investment accounts opened during the month of IPO (natural logarithm)
Err Forecast bias. Err = (Median value of analyst forecasts of oﬀering price–Oﬀering price)/Oﬀering price
Lerr Lerr = (Maximum Err–Forecast bias)/(Maximum Err–Minimum Err)
Disp Forecast dispersion. Disp = Standard deviation of analyst forecasts of oﬀering price/Median value of analyst forecasts of
oﬀering price
Ldisp Ldisp = (Maximum Disp–Forecast dispersion)/(Maximum Disp–Minimum Disp)
PE Oﬀering price-to-earnings ratio, calculated according to the fully diluted method
Lnta Natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the previous year before listing
ROE Return on equity at the end of the previous year before listing
LEV Leverage ratio at the end of the previous year before listing
Growth Sales growth at the end of the previous year before listing
Shriss Proportion of new issues after listing
Age Number of days (divided by 360) between establishment and listing
Regu Dummy variable representing oﬀering-price regulation. Equals 1 if the oﬀering price is determined under regulation and 0 if
it is determined by market mechanism
Delay Waiting period. Equals the number of days (divided by 360) between the ﬁrm’s oﬀering and listing
ZXB Equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the small- and medium-sized enterprises board and 0 otherwise
CYB Equals 1 if the ﬁrm is listed in the growth enterprise market and 0 otherwise
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max.
IR 949 0.700 0.791 0.118 0.436 3.807
Mret 949 0.239 0.357 0.377 0.205 1.549
NewAcct 949 4.256 0.663 1.548 4.148 6.042
nFollow 949 8.256 3.821 3.000 8.000 26.000
Err 949 0.248 0.405 0.269 0.127 3.255
Lerr 949 0.882 0.092 0.198 0.910 1.000
Disp 949 0.170 0.078 0.016 0.163 0.534
Ldisp 949 0.682 0.145 0.000 0.694 0.969
PE 949 45.965 20.387 12.220 42.560 108.700
Shriss 949 0.248 0.046 0.100 0.250 0.444
TA 949 11.044 1.132 9.358 10.832 15.483
ROE 949 0.265 0.101 0.055 0.253 0.597
LEV 949 0.487 0.163 0.120 0.495 0.839
Growth 949 0.285 0.285 0.236 0.231 1.396
Age 949 4.086 3.162 0.819 2.775 14.333
Delay 949 0.035 0.014 0.022 0.031 0.108
ZXB 949 0.601 0.490 0 1 1
CYB 949 0.272 0.445 0 0 1
Regu 949 0.126 0.333 0 0 1
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5.2.1. Empirical results
First, we examine the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment and analyst forecasts on IPO initial returns.
Table 3 shows the results. We use cumulative market returns before listing to measure market sentiment in
columns (1)–(3), and use the number of new accounts opened in the month of listing to measure market sen-
timent in columns (4)–(6). After controlling for other factors, we ﬁnd market-wide sentiment to be positively
related to IPO initial returns. The coeﬃcient of cumulative market return (Mret) is 0.725 and the coeﬃcient of
new accounts (Acct) is 0.272. The positive relationship between market sentiment and initial returns infers that
secondary market over-pricing is the main cause of IPO initial returns. The coeﬃcient would be negative if the
primary market underpricing theory dominates. We add Lerr to columns (2) and (5) to determine the inﬂuence
of analyst forecast bias. The results show that the lower the analyst forecast bias, the weaker the initial return.
We add Ldisp to columns (3) and (6) to determine the inﬂuence of forecast dispersion. The results show that
the lower the analyst forecast dispersion, the weaker the initial return. All of these results demonstrate that
forecast bias and dispersion may lower initial returns.
Among the control variables, TA and ROE are negatively related to IPO initial returns. This result indicates
that the transparent information environment of a large ﬁrm decreases the asymmetry between ﬁrms and
investors and hence lowers the initial returns. The higher the proﬁtability, the lower the initial return. The sales
growth rate raises the level of initial returns due to its high ﬁnancial volatility and valuation diﬃculty. The
oﬀering price-to-earnings ratio (PE) and proportion of new issues (Shriss) are negatively related to initial
returns. The regulation and waiting periods have positive eﬀects on initial returns. In addition, the initial
returns of ﬁrms listed on the small- and medium-sized enterprises board and in the growth enterprise market
are lower than those of ﬁrms listed on the main board due to the diﬀerences in size, growth and oﬀering price
level.
To further investigate the inﬂuence of analyst forecasts, we add the interaction of analyst forecast charac-
teristics and market-wide sentiment to the empirical model. Table 4 shows the results. Columns (1) and (2)
investigate the inﬂuence of the interaction on initial returns and indicate a negative relationship for both mea-
surements. The coeﬃcient of the interaction of analyst forecast bias and market-wide sentiment shows that a
lower analyst forecast bias signiﬁcantly decreases trading frequency in an improved information environment
and thus weakens the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on IPO initial returns. The coeﬃcient of the inter-
action is signiﬁcantly negative as expected.
Table 3
The inﬂuence of individual factors on IPO initial returns.
SENT= Mret Acct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SENT 0.725*** 0.620*** 0.716*** 0.272*** 0.226*** 0.267***
(10.09) (9.80) (10.04) (6.06) (5.77) (6.01)
Lerr 4.334*** 4.482***
(16.72) (16.79)
Ldisp 0.552*** 0.575***
(4.22) (4.25)
TA 0.213*** 0.186*** 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.182*** 0.210***
(8.23) (8.18) (8.33) (7.82) (7.74) (7.91)
ROE 1.142*** 1.164*** 1.054*** 1.189*** 1.205*** 1.097***
(6.02) (7.01) (5.57) (6.06) (7.03) (5.61)
LEV 0.105 0.170 0.140 0.182 0.239** 0.218
(0.79) (1.47) (1.07) (1.34) (2.00) (1.61)
Growth 0.290*** 0.190*** 0.269*** 0.260*** 0.162*** 0.239***
(4.32) (3.22) (4.03) (3.76) (2.66) (3.47)
PE 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.006***
(6.36) (4.10) (6.85) (4.32) (2.06) (4.84)
Shriss 0.833* 1.278*** 0.873** 0.578 1.078*** 0.624
(1.89) (3.31) (2.00) (1.27) (2.70) (1.38)
Age 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.003
(0.59) (0.16) (0.75) (0.35) (0.08) (0.52)
Delay 1.348 2.977** 1.547 2.422 3.917*** 2.608
(0.88) (2.21) (1.01) (1.50) (2.77) (1.63)
Regu 0.351*** 0.162** 0.342*** 0.329*** 0.137** 0.320***
(4.88) (2.54) (4.79) (4.41) (2.07) (4.32)
ZXB 0.159** 0.132* 0.163** 0.185** 0.153** 0.188**
(2.00) (1.90) (2.07) (2.25) (2.13) (2.31)
CYB 0.235** 0.224*** 0.250*** 0.269*** 0.253*** 0.284***
(2.55) (2.78) (2.74) (2.83) (3.04) (3.01)
Cons 4.272*** 6.556*** 4.726*** 2.966*** 5.546*** 3.460***
(10.62) (17.37) (11.45) (6.36) (12.73) (7.26)
Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 949 949 949 949 949 949
R2_Adj 0.605 0.698 0.612 0.578 0.677 0.586
F 38.223 55.677 38.400 34.261 50.771 34.483
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
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timent on initial returns. The results also show that lower analyst forecast dispersion may signiﬁcantly
decrease trading frequency and thus weaken the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on IPO initial returns.
Hypothesis 1 is thus supported.
5.2.2. Robustness checks
We conduct the following robustness checks to enhance the reliability of our results.
First, we change the calculation window for cumulative market returns. We calculate the cumulative mar-
ket returns for the 90 (120 in the preceding analysis) trading days before listing to measure market sentiment.
The results are shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. Although we change the calculation window, market-
wide sentiment continues to have a positive eﬀect on IPO initial returns and a lower analyst forecast bias and
dispersion signiﬁcantly weaken the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on IPO initial returns.
Second, we use industry cumulative returns to measure investor sentiment. Researchers have discovered
remarkable price co-movements within industries and have observed that investor sentiment plays an
Table 4
Test of Hypothesis 1.
SENT= Mret Acct SENT= Mret Acct
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SENT 2.307*** 0.856*** SENT 1.473*** 0.607***
(5.42) (3.89) (6.60) (4.73)
Lerr 3.497*** 1.076 Ldisp 0.220 1.701**
(10.56) (0.89) (1.38) (2.08)
SENT  Lerr 2.004*** 0.742*** SENT  Ldisp 1.158*** 0.514***
(4.01) (2.90) (3.58) (2.82)
TA 0.181*** 0.183*** TA 0.208*** 0.207***
(8.04) (7.82) (8.16) (7.84)
ROE 1.174*** 1.200*** ROE 1.028*** 1.090***
(7.13) (7.03) (5.46) (5.60)
LEV 0.160 0.226* LEV 0.111 0.190
(1.40) (1.90) (0.85) (1.40)
Growth 0.191*** 0.159*** Growth 0.271*** 0.241***
(3.27) (2.63) (4.10) (3.51)
PE 0.004*** 0.002** PE 0.008*** 0.005***
(3.99) (2.18) (6.46) (4.64)
Shriss 1.171*** 1.042*** Shriss 0.901** 0.636
(3.05) (2.62) (2.08) (1.42)
Age 0.002 0.000 Age 0.006 0.004
(0.34) (0.02) (1.01) (0.70)
Delay 2.876** 3.812*** Delay 1.786 2.889*
(2.15) (2.70) (1.18) (1.81)
Regu 0.147** 0.128* Regu 0.346*** 0.313***
(2.31) (1.94) (4.87) (4.25)
ZXB 0.143** 0.165** ZXB 0.166** 0.188**
(2.07) (2.31) (2.12) (2.32)
CYB 0.229*** 0.265*** CYB 0.253*** 0.283***
(2.87) (3.19) (2.79) (3.01)
Cons 5.869*** 2.778*** Cons 4.407*** 1.891***
(14.25) (2.65) (10.50) (2.59)
Ind Yes Yes Ind Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Year Yes Yes
N 949 949 N 949 949
R2_Adj 0.703 0.680 R2_Adj 0.617 0.589
F 55.610 50.144 F 38.263 34.095
p 0.000 0.000 p 0.000 0.000
* Signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
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industry cumulative returns may be a better measurement of sentiment. Accordingly, we use industry cumu-
lative returns in the 120 trading days before listing to measure sentiment. The results are shown in columns (3)
and (4) of Table 5 and continue to support Hypothesis 1.
Third, we use the mean value of analyst forecasts as the consensus analyst forecast and recalculate analyst
forecast bias and forecast dispersion. The results are shown in columns (5)–(8) of Table 5 and our ﬁndings are
still consistent.
5.3. Test of Hypothesis 2
To investigate whether the eﬀect of analyst forecasts (i.e., weakening the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment
on initial returns) depends on investor attention, we use cumulative market returns before listing to measure
the market condition and divide the sample period into periods of rising markets and falling markets. Table 6
shows the results.
Table 5
Robustness checks.
SENT= Mret_90d Mret_90d Iret_120d Iret_120d Mret_120d Mret_120d NewAcct NewAcct
Forecast Characteristic= Opt_med Disp_med Opt_med Disp_med Opt_mean Disp_mean Opt_mean Disp_mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SENT 3.767*** 0.975*** 1.779*** 1.312*** 2.290*** 1.425*** 0.862*** 0.603***
(5.09) (2.71) (4.04) (5.58) (5.49) (7.67) (3.92) (5.55)
Lerr 3.798*** 3.954*** 3.830*** 1.325
(12.07) (12.91) (11.50) (1.10)
SENT  Lerr 3.918*** 1.464*** 1.985*** 0.757***
(4.66) (2.83) (4.06) (2.98)
Ldisp 0.431*** 0.280* 0.205 1.917**
(2.66) (1.79) (1.44) (2.57)
SENT  Ldisp 0.948* 1.071*** 1.212*** 0.565***
(1.82) (3.12) (4.14) (3.38)
TA 0.182*** 0.215*** 0.185*** 0.215*** 0.174*** 0.207*** 0.176*** 0.207***
(7.78) (8.02) (8.13) (8.32) (7.81) (8.15) (7.59) (7.85)
ROE 1.216*** 1.052*** 1.143*** 1.000*** 1.131*** 1.021*** 1.155*** 1.083***
(7.11) (5.32) (6.87) (5.25) (6.95) (5.46) (6.84) (5.59)
LEV 0.217* 0.210 0.205* 0.178 0.156 0.109 0.222* 0.187
(1.82) (1.53) (1.77) (1.35) (1.37) (0.84) (1.89) (1.38)
Growth 0.171*** 0.241*** 0.174*** 0.250*** 0.185*** 0.271*** 0.154** 0.239***
(2.82) (3.46) (2.94) (3.74) (3.19) (4.10) (2.57) (3.50)
PE 0.003** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.002* 0.006***
(2.45) (5.07) (3.65) (6.30) (3.65) (6.49) (1.85) (4.73)
Shriss 1.220*** 0.852* 1.085*** 0.756* 1.181*** 0.909** 1.046*** 0.652
(3.06) (1.86) (2.79) (1.72) (3.11) (2.10) (2.66) (1.46)
Age 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.000 0.004
(0.10) (0.61) (0.22) (0.99) (0.45) (1.04) (0.10) (0.72)
Delay 2.382* 0.835 2.876** 1.743 3.253** 1.817 4.126*** 2.970*
(1.71) (0.52) (2.12) (1.13) (2.46) (1.20) (2.95) (1.86)
Regu 0.155** 0.365*** 0.171*** 0.359*** 0.132** 0.345*** 0.114* 0.310***
(2.35) (4.88) (2.66) (5.00) (2.10) (4.89) (1.74) (4.22)
ZXB 0.152** 0.170** 0.143** 0.170** 0.134* 0.168** 0.155** 0.189**
(2.12) (2.07) (2.04) (2.15) (1.96) (2.16) (2.19) (2.34)
CYB 0.248*** 0.274*** 0.237*** 0.264*** 0.222*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 0.286***
(2.98) (2.87) (2.93) (2.88) (2.81) (2.84) (3.12) (3.06)
Cons 6.074*** 4.696*** 6.193*** 4.460*** 6.022*** 4.381*** 2.899*** 1.880***
(14.67) (10.78) (15.28) (10.53) (14.75) (10.63) (2.77) (2.86)
Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 949 949 949 949 949 949 949 949
R2_Adj 0.679 0.576 0.696 0.608 0.710 0.620 0.687 0.592
F 49.933 32.465 53.991 36.853 57.524 38.738 51.716 34.521
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
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model (1) for diﬀerent sample periods. During the rising market periods, the coeﬃcient of sentiment is signif-
icantly positive and the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is signiﬁcantly negative. Thus, market-wide senti-
ment is the primary cause of initial returns and a lower analyst forecast bias signiﬁcantly weakens the
inﬂuence of sentiment on those returns. However, during the declining market periods, the coeﬃcient of
the interaction term is insigniﬁcant. Columns (3) and (4) use new accounts opened during the month of listing
to measure market sentiment and obtain similar results.
Columns (5)–(8) use cumulative market returns and the number of new accounts to measure market-wide
sentiment and re-estimate model (2) for both periods to investigate whether lower analyst forecast dispersion
Table 6
Test of Hypothesis 2.
SENT= Mret Acct SENT= Mret Acct
Market Rise Market Decline Market Rise Market Decline Market Rise Market Decline Market Rise Market Decline
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SENT 2.096*** 8.005* 0.814*** 0.077 SENT 1.553*** 1.518 0.567*** 0.612
(4.24) (1.81) (3.36) (0.05) (5.60) (1.09) (4.04) (0.67)
Lerr 3.689*** 1.959* 1.235 0.458 Ldisp 0.047 0.363 1.640* 3.751
(9.05) (1.76) (0.90) (0.07) (0.21) (1.04) (1.76) (0.80)
SENT  Lerr 1.806*** 7.841 0.704** 0.272 SENT  Ldisp 1.418*** 3.854** 0.491** 0.977
(3.02) (1.56) (2.48) (0.16) (3.42) (1.99) (2.42) (0.83)
TA 0.185*** 0.148*** 0.191*** 0.146*** TA 0.220*** 0.141*** 0.223*** 0.151***
(6.84) (3.42) (6.84) (3.24) (7.07) (3.22) (6.99) (3.33)
ROE 1.206*** 1.137*** 1.213*** 0.980*** ROE 1.034*** 1.039*** 1.094*** 0.937***
(6.03) (3.78) (5.89) (3.18) (4.45) (3.47) (4.59) (3.02)
LEV 0.153 0.095 0.228 0.135 LEV 0.076 0.067 0.166 0.152
(1.12) (0.44) (1.61) (0.61) (0.48) (0.31) (1.03) (0.68)
Growth 0.216*** 0.054 0.186** 0.054 Growth 0.332*** 0.045 0.307*** 0.063
(3.03) (0.50) (2.54) (0.49) (4.07) (0.42) (3.68) (0.56)
PE 0.004*** 0.004 0.003*** 0.003 PE 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.004
(3.56) (1.45) (2.71) (0.90) (5.22) (2.29) (4.47) (1.64)
Shriss 1.204*** 1.098 1.049** 1.374 Shriss 0.924* 0.879 0.664 1.124
(2.73) (1.32) (2.32) (1.60) (1.83) (1.06) (1.28) (1.31)
Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005 Age 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.005
(0.16) (0.18) (0.28) (0.51) (0.74) (0.07) (0.31) (0.54)
Delay 3.243** 3.675 3.934** 2.395 Delay 1.673 3.032 2.578 1.588
(2.19) (0.88) (2.55) (0.53) (0.99) (0.73) (1.46) (0.36)
Regu 0.256*** 0.325** 0.205*** 0.139 Regu 0.452*** 0.211 0.373*** 0.132
(3.40) (2.48) (2.66) (1.08) (5.29) (1.58) (4.27) (1.01)
ZXB 0.171* 0.012 0.200** 0.012 ZXB 0.203** 0.013 0.213** 0.011
(1.93) (0.11) (2.19) (0.10) (1.99) (0.12) (2.04) (0.09)
CYB 0.283*** 0.009 0.323*** 0.014 CYB 0.327*** 0.020 0.353*** 0.018
(2.78) (0.07) (3.09) (0.10) (2.79) (0.15) (2.95) (0.13)
Cons 6.084*** 4.306*** 3.108*** 3.469 Cons 4.456*** 2.289*** 2.277*** 0.290
(12.59) (3.62) (2.67) (0.57) (8.84) (2.84) (2.74) (0.07)
Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 718 231 718 231 N 718 231 718 231
R2_Adj 0.716 0.370 0.699 0.331 R2_Adj 0.623 0.373 0.604 0.323
F 45.048 4.859 41.627 4.248 F 29.891 4.915 27.681 4.141
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
* Signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
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208 H. Zhu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 193–211weakens the inﬂuence of sentiment on initial returns. The results show that lower analyst forecast dispersion
weakens only the inﬂuence of sentiment on initial returns during the periods of rising markets (columns (5)
and (7)). The coeﬃcient of the interaction term is insigniﬁcant (column (8)) or signiﬁcantly positive (column
(6)) during the periods of declining markets.5.4. Test of Hypothesis 3
To analyze the eﬀect of analyst forecasts across diﬀerent periods of regulation, we divide the sample period
into pricing regulated and marketization periods based on the regulation rules. The speciﬁc method is
described in the deﬁnition of Regu. Table 7 shows the results.
Columns (1) and (2) use cumulative market returns to measure sentiment and investigate the eﬀect of
analyst forecasts across diﬀerent sample periods. The results show that sentiment has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect on initial returns during the marketization period. However, the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantTable 7
Test of Hypothesis 3.
SENT= Mret Acct SENT= Mret Acct
Regulated Market-
oriented
Regulated Market-
oriented
Regulated Market-
oriented
Regulated Market-
oriented
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SENT 0.368 3.778*** 0.144 1.072*** SENT 1.273* 1.642*** 0.702 0.547***
(0.35) (6.18) (0.26) (3.34) (1.70) (6.48) (1.61) (3.67)
Lerr 5.762*** 2.239*** 9.137** 0.960 Ldisp 0.449 0.095 0.344 2.004**
(5.77) (5.87) (2.57) (0.60) (0.51) (0.64) (0.10) (2.22)
SENT  Lerr 0.455 3.578*** 0.725 1.052*** SENT  Ldisp 0.356 1.429*** 0.134 0.579***
(0.34) (5.19) (1.02) (2.90) (0.31) (4.03) (0.20) (2.77)
TA 0.390*** 0.172*** 0.417*** 0.172*** TA 0.412** 0.189*** 0.470*** 0.188***
(3.10) (7.91) (3.28) (7.56) (2.43) (8.12) (2.72) (7.77)
ROE 0.252 1.179*** 0.865 1.169*** ROE 0.214 1.013*** 0.998 1.030***
(0.27) (7.45) (0.91) (7.06) (0.17) (5.95) (0.77) (5.82)
LEV 0.637 0.177 1.127* 0.212* LEV 0.073 0.165 0.540 0.209*
(1.01) (1.61) (1.77) (1.84) (0.09) (1.40) (0.63) (1.70)
Growth 0.103 0.200*** 0.065 0.198*** Growth 0.476 0.241*** 0.373 0.234***
(0.37) (3.47) (0.23) (3.28) (1.31) (3.90) (1.00) (3.63)
PE 0.096 0.005*** 0.035 0.003*** PE 0.387** 0.007*** 0.237 0.005***
(0.79) (5.03) (0.28) (2.78) (2.47) (6.99) (1.48) (5.06)
Shriss 1.379 0.978*** 1.975 0.863** Shriss 2.185 0.729* 2.666 0.504
(0.66) (2.65) (0.92) (2.24) (0.77) (1.85) (0.92) (1.23)
Age 0.007 0.002 0.016 0.005 Age 0.016 0.006 0.018 0.009
(0.30) (0.42) (0.74) (1.01) (0.55) (1.14) (0.63) (1.61)
Delay 9.456 2.715** 13.585* 2.627* Delay 3.144 2.051 10.011 2.024
(1.24) (2.11) (1.76) (1.90) (0.31) (1.49) (0.97) (1.38)
ZXB 0.961** 0.126* 0.985** 0.133* ZXB 0.587 0.145** 0.627 0.156**
(2.13) (1.92) (2.15) (1.93) (0.97) (2.07) (1.02) (2.14)
CYB 0.186** 0.217*** CYB 0.199** 0.227***
(2.45) (2.73) (2.44) (2.67)
Cons 9.701** 4.864*** 14.919*** 1.338 Cons 2.875 3.984*** 1.004 1.873**
(2.30) (11.54) (2.79) (0.95) (0.57) (10.38) (0.18) (2.45)
Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes Ind Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 120 829 120 829 N 120 829 120 829
R2_Adj 0.646 0.577 0.634 0.537 R2_Adj 0.361 0.515 0.334 0.474
F 7.777 29.999 7.446 25.625 F 3.102 23.539 2.869 20.116
* Signiﬁcance levels at 10%.
** Signiﬁcance levels at 5%.
*** Signiﬁcance levels at 1%.
H. Zhu et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 8 (2015) 193–211 209during the regulated period. This is consistent with our preceding analysis. When regulation of the
oﬀering-price-to-earnings ratio is canceled during the marketization period, investor sentiment in the second-
ary market is the primary cause of high IPO initial returns. In addition, the interaction is signiﬁcantly negative
during the marketization period. This ﬁnding indicates that lower analyst forecast bias signiﬁcantly weakens
the inﬂuence of market-wide sentiment on initial returns. However, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is
insigniﬁcant during the regulated period. We also use the number of new accounts opened during the listing
month to measure sentiment and ﬁnd similar results. Sentiment has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on initial
returns only during the marketization period and lower analyst forecast bias only weakens the relationships
during this period.
Columns (5)–(8) use analyst forecast dispersion as the independent variable to investigate the eﬀect of ana-
lyst forecasts across diﬀerent sample periods. Hypothesis 3 remains highly supported.6. Conclusion
Speculative sentiment and lack of rationality are long-standing drawbacks in the Chinese stock market,
especially during IPOs. Trading driven by sentiment not only induces prices that deviate from their intrinsic
value, but also exacerbates market volatility. Normalizing investor behavior and improving market rationality
are essential for the development of the Chinese stock market.
This paper investigates the inﬂuence of sentiment on stock prices during IPOs and determines that market-
wide sentiment has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on IPO initial returns. We use analyst forecast bias and forecast disper-
sion to measure the information environment and investigate whether an improvement of that environment
weakens the inﬂuence of sentiment on stock prices. We ﬁnd that lower analyst forecast bias and forecast dis-
persion decrease noise trading and thus weaken the inﬂuence of sentiment on IPO initial returns.
These results have several implications. First, noise trading is caused by the subjective reasons of investors
and the objective information environment faced by those investors. Information asymmetry is an important
cause of noise trading and results in the deviation of stock prices from their intrinsic value. Improving the
information environment and information transparency is the eﬀective way of decreasing noise trading.
Accordingly, the improvement of information disclosure quality is the key point of IPO reforms.
Second, the results aﬃrm the positive role played by analysts. Although we cannot rule out that analyst
forecast bias is caused by a conﬂict of interest among stakeholders, the empirical results show that, as infor-
mation intermediaries, analysts lower the information asymmetry between ﬁrms and investors. Encouraging
the development of intermediaries such as analysts may accelerate the improvement of the information system
in the capital market.
Third, we ﬁnd that the analyst’s role as an intermediary works only during marketization periods. There-
fore, we can infer that pricing regulation is essential for information system eﬀectiveness. The regulation of
oﬀering prices ignores diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics and leads to price distortion. Consequently, the gov-
ernment should change its role from participant to regulator during periods of market-oriented reform, after
which the market can truly be rectiﬁed and improved.
Finally, we ﬁnd that investor attention is the premise for information acquisition. Strengthening investor
education and guiding investors to establish correct investment concepts and sustain their attention are nec-
essary steps in the development of the capital market.Acknowledgements
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